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OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge 
 After he defaulted on a $1,000 loan and his car was 
repossessed, Appellant Heiko Goldenstein brought suit 
against Appellees Repossessors, Inc. and Shady Oak 
Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Premier Finance Adjusters and their 
individual owners, alleging the repossession was unlawful 
and seeking treble damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.  
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Specifically, Goldenstein claimed violations of various state 
and federal consumer protection statutes, as well as the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”).  Because we conclude that the District Court erred 
in the basis on which it granted summary judgment against 
Goldenstein on his RICO claim and two of his state law 
claims, we will affirm in part and reverse and remand in part 
for the District Court’s further consideration of those claims.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1  
 In April 2012, Goldenstein, a resident of Pennsylvania, 
obtained a $1,000 online loan from Sovereign Lending 
Solutions, LLC, d/b/a Title Loan America.  As a consumer 
lending company wholly owned by the Lac Vieux Desert 
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians and incorporated 
under Chippewa tribal law, Sovereign was authorized to issue 
loans secured by vehicles at interest rates far greater than 
permitted under Pennsylvania law.  App. vol. 2, 123, 264.  
Goldenstein pledged his car as collateral and was charged 250 
percent interest for his loan.2   
                                              
 1 Unless otherwise noted, the background is adopted 
from the facts as found by the District Court in its opinion.  
See Goldenstein v. Repossessors, Inc., No. 13-cv-02797, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97002 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2014). 
 
 2 The Appellees do not contest Goldenstein’s 
calculations of the interest rate, nor do they dispute that the 
rate was in excess of what is permitted by Pennsylvania law.  
Although Appellees argued before the District Court that 
Goldenstein could not support his claims because he could 
4 
 
 Accounting for the interest due, Sovereign, after 
deducting a $50 transfer fee and wiring the remaining $950 of 
the loan to Goldenstein’s bank account, withdrew monthly 
installments of $207.90 from Goldenstein’s bank account in 
June 2012 and again in July 2012.  The District Court found 
for the purposes of summary judgment that Goldenstein 
removed his funds from the account because he did not 
recognize the account activity on his bank statements.  As a 
result, when Sovereign attempted to collect a third installment 
payment in August 2012, it was rejected for insufficient 
funds.  Sovereign then contracted with Repossessors, Inc. to 
forfeit Goldenstein’s collateral, and Repossessors, Inc., in 
turn, contracted with Shady Oak Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a 
Premier Finance Adjusters (“Premier”), which took 
possession of Goldenstein’s car.  When Goldenstein 
attempted to recover his car a few days later, App. vol. 2, 45, 
Premier informed Goldenstein that his payment would not be 
accepted nor his car returned unless he signed release 
documents.  After conferring with his attorney, Goldenstein 
paid Premier $2,393 ($2,143 to satisfy the loan and $250 in 
repossession fees) and signed the releases.   
 Goldenstein filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a three-count 
complaint.  In the first count, Goldenstein claimed violations 
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, and Pennsylvania’s Fair Credit 
Extension Uniformity Act (“PFCEUA”), 73 Pa. Stat. and 
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2270.1–2270.6 based in part on alleged 
                                                                                                     
not produce a copy of his loan document, they do not renew 
that argument here.    
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violations of Pennsylvania’s Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”), 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1101–9710.3  The FDCPA 
claim was premised on the notion that Appellees had no 
present right to possession of Goldenstein’s car because the 
loan was usurious under Pennsylvania law.  As for the 
PFCEUA and UCC claims, Goldenstein alleged that the 
Appellees made “false, deceptive, or misleading 
representations” and engaged in “unfair or unconscionable 
means of debt collection” when, among other things, they 
required Goldenstein to sign the releases before recovering 
his car.  App. vol. 2, 8.  The second and third counts of the 
complaint claimed that Repossessors, Inc. and Premier, both 
individually and jointly, constituted a RICO “enterprise” and 
that the repossession of Goldenstein’s car involved the 
“collection of unlawful debt,” in violation of 18 U.S.C.            
§ 1962(c), and gave rise to a RICO conspiracy, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).  App. vol. 2, 9-12. 
The District Court granted Appellees’ motion for 
summary judgment and entered judgment against Goldenstein 
on all claims.  Goldenstein v. Repossessors, Inc., No. 13-cv-
02797, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97002, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 
2014).  As to the FDCPA claim, the District Court held there 
was no violation because the Appellees had a right to possess 
the car as collateral for the unpaid loan.  Id. at *19-22.  As to 
                                              
 
3 While the alleged UCC violation is not identified as a 
separate claim in the complaint, it is referenced within the 
allegations for violations of the PFCEUA, see App. vol. 2, 8 
(Compl. ¶¶ 44(b), 45(b)), and more clearly outlined in 
Goldenstein’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, see Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. 
Summ. J. 13-15, ECF No. 40-1.  
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the RICO claim, the District Court held that the repossession 
of collateral could not constitute the “collection of unlawful 
debt” as a matter of law; it therefore did not address any other 
element of the RICO claim.  Id. at *22-23.  Nor did the 
District Court address Goldenstein’s claims for violations of 
the PFCEUA and the UCC relating to the releases.4  This 
appeal followed. 
                                              
 
4 The District Court reasoned erroneously that the 
“FDCPA and PFCEUA claims share identical elements and 
will be analyzed as one claim for purposes of this Opinion.”  
Goldenstein, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97002, at *16 n.36.  
Giving the District Court the benefit of the doubt, it may have 
taken this approach because both of those claims were 
included in Count One of the complaint.  As discussed in 
more detail below, however, the PFCEUA claim is distinct 
from the FDCPA claim and is predicated not on the alleged 
absence of Premier’s present right to possession of the car but 
on alleged misrepresentations related to the releases Premier 
required Goldenstein to sign in order to recover his car.  The 
District Court did not engage the merits of this claim or 
Appellees’ arguments that the releases barred this litigation.  
Raising additional concerns in this Court’s mind about the 
care with which the District Court considered Goldenstein’s 
claims, the District Court granted summary judgment on the 
PFCEUA and UCC claims although Appellees did not 
specifically argue those claims in their motion for summary 
judgment and proceeded to state in its opinion that it was 
granting summary judgment as to Count One and Count Two 
of the complaint without making any mention of Count 
Three, the RICO conspiracy claim.  Id. at *22-23.  
Nonetheless, the District Court granted judgment against 
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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.   
§ 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review of a district court’s grant 
of summary judgment.  Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 
(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 
165 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if 
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 
222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  When deciding a motion for 
summary judgment, “[a]ll reasonable inferences from the 
record must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party” and 
the court “may not weigh the evidence or assess credibility.”  
MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 209 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).  
 In a motion for summary judgment, it is initially the 
moving party’s burden to “demonstrate the absence of a 
genuine [dispute] of material fact.”  Mathews v. Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 250 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986)).  A 
factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986).  Conversely, “where a non-moving party fails 
sufficiently to establish the existence of an essential element 
                                                                                                     
Goldenstein “on all claims” and closed the case.  Id. at *23-
25. 
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of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, there 
is not a genuine dispute with respect to a material fact and 
thus the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 
(3d Cir. 2014). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 We agree with the District Court that, although the 
loan may have been usurious under Pennsylvania law, 
Appellees nonetheless had a present right to possession of 
Goldenstein’s car and their repossession of it therefore did not 
violate the FDCPA.  We cannot agree, however, that 
forfeiture of collateral cannot amount to the “collection of 
unlawful debt” under the RICO statute.  And as the District 
Court did not address the merits of Goldenstein’s claims 
alleging violations of the PFCEUA and the UCC, we decline 
to do so in the first instance.  We address these issues in turn.   
 A.  Goldenstein’s FDCPA Claim 
 Goldenstein raises two challenges to the District 
Court’s holding that, because Goldenstein defaulted on his 
loan, Appellees had a present right to possession of his car as 
collateral and therefore did not violate the FDCPA.  
 First, he contends that no present right to possession 
could attach to his car because the loan it secured was made 
at a usurious rate of interest in violation of Pennsylvania’s 
Loan Interest and Protection Law (“LIPL”), 41 Pa. Stat. and 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201.  Even when the interest rate is 
usurious, however, the LIPL does not void the entire loan or 
the legal interest, nor does it make it illegal for a lender to 
collect an unpaid debt.  Instead, the LIPL only makes 
9 
 
voidable “the interest specified beyond the lawful rate,” Pa. 
Dep’t of Banking v. NCAS of Del., LLC, 995 A.2d 422, 440 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mulcahy 
v. Loftus, 267 A.2d, 872, 873 (Pa. 1970)), and Pennsylvania 
law expressly permits a secured party to “take possession of 
the collateral” after default, “without judicial process if it 
proceeds without breach of the peace,” 13 Pa. Cons. Stat.        
§ 9609.  Thus, having admittedly defaulted on his loan—
including removing the funds from his bank account without 
further communication with the lender and failing to make 
three monthly payments before his car was repossessed—
Goldenstein cannot now contest Sovereign’s right to 
repossess the collateral he posted in the event of just such a 
default.    
 Second, Goldenstein argues that the repossession was 
unlawful because his arrearage—assuming he had been 
accruing interest at a six percent rate as permitted by 
Pennsylvania law and deducting Sovereign’s first two 
deductions from his bank account from his overall balance—
would have been a mere $9.60, and his failure to make this de 
minimis payment could not constitute a material breach of the 
loan contract.  That argument, however, finds no support in 
the LIPL.  While that statute provides important protections 
to borrowers who fall victim to usurious loans, it does not 
empower borrowers to recalculate what they owe by 
construing interest paid in excess of the legal rate as paid 
principal, nor does it preclude lenders from repossessing the 
collateral on a defaulted loan.  See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9609; 
Pa. Dep’t of Banking, 995 A.2d at 440.   
 The District Court thus correctly concluded that the 
Appellees had a present right to possession and did not 
violate the FDCPA when they repossessed Goldenstein’s car.   
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 B.  Goldenstein’s RICO Claim 
  1.  The Collection of Unlawful Debt 
 RICO makes it unlawful for a person associated with a 
RICO “enterprise” to participate in the conduct of such 
enterprise “through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
collection of unlawful debt.”5  18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  The 
District Court dismissed Goldenstein’s RICO claim by 
summarily stating “[i]t is well-settled by this court that the 
repossession of collateral is clearly distinguishable from the 
collection of unlawful debt and does not give rise to a RICO 
claim,” and citing to the opinion of another District Judge in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania who had reached that 
conclusion.  Goldenstein, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97002, at 
*23 (citing Collins v. Siani’s Salvage, LLC, No. 13-3044, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39930, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 
2014)).  Indeed, two judges in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, in addition to the District Judge here, have held 
that when a repossession company repossesses a car as 
collateral for an unpaid debt, the repossession company “[i]s 
                                              
 5 While ordinarily a RICO claim requires a plaintiff to 
prove the defendants participated in the enterprise “through a 
pattern of racketeering activity,” United States v. Console, 13 
F.3d 641, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted), the “collection of unlawful debt” is 
an act native to the RICO statute and does not require a 
pattern of activities to constitute a violation, see United States 
v. Vastola, 899 F.2d 211, 228 n.21 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding 
that a single collection satisfies the requirements for the 
“collection of unlawful debt” and no further pattern or 
predicate act need be shown).  
 
11 
 
not collecting the debt that [the lender] alleged it [i]s owed 
under the loan agreement.  Rather, [the repossession 
company] [i]s repossessing the collateral for that debt.”  
Collins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39930, at *14 (quoting 
Gonzalez v. DRS Towing, LLC, No. 12-cv-05508, at 7 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 28, 2013)).  That position, however, is far from 
settled.   
 No Court of Appeals has yet addressed this question; 
nor are the District Judges unanimous, even in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  On the contrary, in a thoughtful and 
well-reasoned opinion in Gregoria v. Total Asset Recovery, 
Inc., No. 12-4315, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1818 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
8, 2015), Judge Lawrence F. Stengel held that the distinction 
between the collection of debt and the collection of collateral 
for a debt is a “distinction without a difference,” and observed 
that when a lender repossesses a debtor’s car as collateral for 
a loan it does so “to liquidate the collateral to satisfy the 
unpaid balance of [the] loan.” Id. at *18 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Citing the “broad construction [it] must give 
the RICO statute,” Judge Stengel recognized that “[w]hether 
the [lender] collected the car or cash, the purpose of the 
collection was to satisfy the debt.”  Id. at *18 & n.11.   
 We agree with the reasoning in Gregoria.  Nothing in 
RICO suggests that Congress intended to limit its prohibition 
on the “collection of unlawful debt” to the seizure of cash and 
to exclude the forfeiture of collateral used to secure unlawful 
debt.  Quite the opposite.  The statute defines “unlawful debt” 
as “a debt (A) incurred . . . which is unenforceable under 
State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or 
interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which 
was incurred in connection with . . . the business of lending 
money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or 
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Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the 
enforceable rate.”  18 U.S.C. § 1961(6).  Thus, the prohibition 
on the “collection of unlawful debt” under the statute 
encompasses efforts to collect on a usurious loan, without 
distinguishing whether the collection is cash or collateral; in 
either case the defendants’ actions effect the collection of the 
unlawful debt.  Cf. United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 
576 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that “a single act which would 
tend to induce another to repay on an unlawful debt incurred 
in the business of lending money” is sufficient for the 
predicate act, and there need not be “[a]n actual exchange of 
cash”).   
 Goldenstein’s is a case in point.  Premier repossessed 
Goldenstein’s car for one of two purposes: either Goldenstein 
would pay off the loan for the return of his car or the car 
would be liquidated with the proceeds used to pay off that 
loan.  Either way, the debt would be collected and the 
usurious loan discharged.  It so happens that Goldenstein 
opted to pay so that Premier collected the outstanding loan 
balance (and then some) in cash.  Thus, the collection of 
collateral and the “collection of unlawful debt” in this very 
case was a “distinction without a difference.”   See Gregoria, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1818 at *18. 
 This practical reality, along with the Supreme Court’s 
instruction that RICO should “be read broadly,” Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985), and its 
clarification that Congress intended RICO to reach both 
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, id. at 499-500; United 
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1981), confirm that 
RICO’s prohibition on the “collection of unlawful debt” can 
reach even a legitimate repossession company that forfeits on 
collateral for a usurious loan—assuming, that is, that the 
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plaintiff can establish the other elements of the violation.  To 
that subject, we now turn. 
  2. The Existence of a RICO Enterprise 
 Here, Appellees urge that Goldenstein cannot satisfy 
other RICO elements, specifically that he cannot prove the 
existence of an “enterprise” because Appellees consisted of 
an “ad hoc group of entities that were connected solely for the 
purpose of repossessing plaintiff’s vehicle,” Appellees’ Br. 
27, and that he cannot establish that Appellees possessed the 
mens rea they argue is required by RICO.  The District Court 
did not address these arguments, which is unsurprising, given 
that, as Appellees conceded at oral argument, they did not 
raise them in their motion for summary judgment.   See Oral 
Argument at 31:17–32:10 (argued May 20, 2015). 
 As a general rule, “a federal appellate court does not 
consider an issue not passed upon below.”  Singleton v. Wulff, 
428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).  While we may make exceptions 
“when the factual record is developed and the issues provide 
purely legal questions, upon which an appellate court 
exercises plenary review,” we will remand “when the issue to 
be addressed is not a purely legal question,” requiring either 
“the exercise of discretion or fact finding.”  Hudson United 
Bank v. LiTenda Mort. Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 
1998).   
 Here, the record is not sufficiently developed for us to 
consider the merits of the parties’ arguments as to the alleged 
enterprise or mens rea.  In light of Appellees’ failure to raise 
these arguments until their responsive brief on appeal, 
Goldenstein did not have the opportunity to supplement the 
factual record on those points, nor to fully brief them for us or 
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the District Court.  Under these circumstances, we will leave 
these issues for the District Court to consider in the first 
instance on remand.  
 C.  Goldenstein’s PFCEUA and UCC Claim 
 The District Court granted summary judgment against 
Goldenstein on his PFCEUA and UCC claims without 
addressing the substance of the PFCEUA claim, without even 
mentioning the UCC claim, and despite the fact that 
Appellees did not argue those claims in their motion for 
summary judgment.6  This too, we conclude, was error. 
 As to the PFCEUA, the District Court granted 
summary judgment on the ground that there was no FDCPA 
violation based on the Appellees’ present right to possession.  
In so doing, the District Court appears to have 
misapprehended the substance of Goldenstein’s PFCEUA 
claim.  Consistent with his argument on appeal, Goldenstein 
urged before the District Court that the PFCEUA’s broad 
definition of “debt collector” encompasses repossession 
companies, see 73 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2270.3; 
that the PFCEUA states that “[i]t shall constitute an unfair or 
                                              
 6 A district court, of course, may grant summary 
judgment sua sponte on claims not raised by the moving party 
where, as here, the non-moving party is on notice and given 
an opportunity to respond.  See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 
326; Gibson v. Mayor & Council of City of Wilmington, 355 
F.3d 215, 224 (3d Cir. 2004).  Where it does so without 
acknowledging or addressing the claims in question, however, 
the court creates uncertainty as to whether it considered the 
claims on the merits and hinders our ability to conduct 
meaningful appellate review.   
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deceptive debt collection act or practice under this act if a 
debt collector violates any of the provisions of the [FDCPA],” 
73 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2270.4; and that the 
FDCPA, in turn, prohibits debt collectors from using any 
“false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt,” 15 U.S.C.           
§ 1692e.  See Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. Summ. J. 15, ECF No. 
40-1.  Thus, according to Goldenstein, Premier’s use of 
“false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s]” to coerce 
Goldenstein to sign the releases to recover his car violated the 
PFCEUA through the § 1692e provision of the FDCPA.  As 
the District Court did not engage this argument or the alleged 
UCC violation, these claims should also be addressed by the 
District Court on remand.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees for 
alleged violations of RICO, the PFCEUA, and the UCC, and 
its judgment, to that extent, will be vacated and the case 
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
